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Internists are well-positioned to play significant roles in
recognizing and responding to epidemics, outbreaks,
and bioterrorist attacks. They see large numbers of
patients with various health problems and may be the
patients’ only interaction with the medical community
for symptoms resulting from infectious diseases and
injuries from radiation, chemicals, and/or burns.
Therefore, Internists must understand early warning
signs of different bioterrorist and infectious agents,
proper reporting channels and measures, various ways
that they can assist the public health response, and
roles of different local, state, and federal agencies. In
addition, it is important to understand effects of a
public health disaster on clinic operations and relevant
legal consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past half decade, well-publicized events, including
the anthrax mail attacks,
1 Hurricane Katrina,
2 and severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
3,4 have reminded us that
epidemics, disease outbreaks, bioterrorist attacks, and natural
disasters can occur. Although there is debate over when and
how they may happen, there is little question that such events
could have significant and far-reaching health, social, and
economic consequences. Moreover, smaller outbreaks, such as
influenza and West Nile Virus,
5 occur with greater regularity.
Internists can play vital roles in identifying, responding to, and
containing bioterrorist attacks and disease outbreaks if they
understand their role in these events.
Internists may be among the first to recognize clues that a
problem is occurring, especially as initial signs and symptoms
maybesubtleormimic commondisorders, promptingvictimsto
contact their primary care physicians, rather than go to
emergency departments.
6 Furthermore, Internists’ broad range
of medical knowledge, experience, and skills make them
uniquely qualified to diagnose and treat a variety of potential
health problems. Internists are alsowell-positioned to workwith
various health care personnel and services during a disaster.
Therefore, Internists must understand early warning signs of
bioterrorist and infectious agents, proper reporting channels
and measures, and ways that they can help contain and treat
the consequences of epidemics, outbreaks, and attacks.
IDENTIFYING BIOTERRORIST ATTACKS, EPIDEMICS,
OR OUTBREAKS
During its initial stages, an attack, epidemic, or outbreak may
not be obvious. Depending on the agent and its mode of
transmission, the population density, and the population’s
access to health care, it can be days or even weeks before
anyone can recognize the problem. As the early response may
be crucial in containing the problem and minimizing resultant
morbidity and mortality, efforts have been made to develop
biosurveillance systems to detect outbreaks and attacks.
7–9
These systems collect pertinent data (e.g., pharmacy drug
sales, emergency department visit chief complaints, and air
samples) and search for irregularities that suggest a problem is
occurring. However, these systems are by no means foolproof
because they only look for a finite set of clues, do not cover
every part of the United States, and may provide equivocal
information. Moreover, there could be delays between the point
that biosurveillance systems detect suspicious patterns and
when the public health system responds. Therefore, Internists
might be the first to become aware of a problem and pivotal in
initiating the public health response.
Internists see large numbers of patients with various health
problems and may be the patients’ only interaction with the
medical community for symptoms resulting from infectious
diseases and injuries from radiation, chemicals, and/or burns.
So they could be the first to report attacks or outbreaks and
initiate public health response. Indeed, there are examples of
“astute” clinicians being the first to recognize epidemic or
bioterrorist attacks (e.g., the 1999 New York City West Nile
outbreak,
5 the 2001 anthrax attack cases,
10,11 and the 2003
SARS epidemic in Vietnam
12).
In some cases, bioterrorist and infectious agents cause
distinctive signs and symptoms.
13,14 For example, of the 10
inhalational anthrax cases in the 2001 attacks, all had fever,
chills, lethargy, and chest x-ray abnormalities. Seven had
mediastinal widening, and 8 had pleural effusions. All but 1
had elevated liver transaminases. A combination of these
findings is highly suspicious for inhalational anthrax, espe-
cially in a young, otherwise healthy patient and/or when a
patient initially experiences nonspecific influenza-like symp-
toms followed first by a brief period of apparent recovery, and
then, by an abrupt resurgence of more severe symptoms.
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131However, in a majority of cases, early symptoms are vague and
readily mistaken for more common upper respiratory infec-
tions (e.g., influenza, plague, tularemia, and staphylococcal
enterotoxin B) or viral gastroenteritis (e.g., hepatitis A, crypto-
sporidium, and salmonella).
Therefore, in addition to looking for specific symptoms,
Internists should remain vigilant about general trends and
patient flow in their clinics.
16 Any of the following may be the
only sign that an attack or outbreak has occurred
17,18:
1. a sudden, unexplained, significant increase in the number
of patients, especially when it occurs outside influenza or
allergy season;
2. a disproportionate number of patients presenting with
similar symptoms (e.g., the 1993 Milwaukee cryptosporid-
ium outbreak
19);
3. many patients coming from the same location (e.g.,
household, school, restaurant, or workplace) or partici-
pating in similar activities (e.g., evening outdoor activities
in the 1999 New York City West Nile Virus outbreak
5 and
dining in the same restaurant in the 2003 Pennsylvania
Hepatitis A outbreak
20);
4. patients reporting sick or dead animals (e.g., crows in West
Nile Virus outbreaks
21,22 and rabbits in tularemia out-
breaks
23);
5. physicians or other clinic staff becoming ill after coming
into contact with patients (e.g., the 2003 SARS epidemic
4);
6. a patient’s health rapidly deteriorates out of proportion to
the presenting symptoms and diagnosis (e.g., a 30-year-
old non-immunocompromised patient dying of pneumonia
is rare);
7. an unusual number of patients fail to respond to
treatments.
An Internist’s index of suspicion should be even higher
when bioterrorism or epidemic alerts are issued.
TREATMENT AND PROPHYLAXIS
Internists must be prepared to address a wide range of
physical, psychological, and social consequences of public
health disasters. Patients may be injured by either a public
health disaster or the ensuing mass panic. In addition,
Internists may have to function as emergency physicians when
emergency departments are overcrowded or unavailable. Spe-
cifically, Internists must be prepared to:
1. treat the exposed and infected. Different organ systems
can be affected (e.g., meningitis from inhalational anthrax,
sepsis from typhoidal tularemia, and pneumonia from
influenza), so complete examinations are important. Web-
sites providing extensive treatment and prophylaxis infor-
mation include the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) (http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugpre-
pare/default.htm), Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/index.shtml), and
National Library of Medicine (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/biodefenseandbioterrorism.html);
2. administer prophylaxis to the exposed but not the
infected. Determining exposure can be difficult as patients
may claim that they have been exposed. In a large-scale
epidemic or attack, public health officials may set up
temporary stations for mass vaccination and prophylaxis.
However, many patients may still appear at clinics
requesting prophylaxis;
3. triage who gets treated in a large outbreak/attack. Inter-
nists will have to prioritize who should receive treatment,
especially when necessary resources and skilled manpow-
er are limited. Knowing when and how to ration treatments
can be challenging, particularly in chaotic conditions.
Although Internists may feel compelled to acquiesce to
every patient’s needs, their primary responsibility in public
health emergencies is the public.
24 While clear guidelines
have not been established and rationing decisions are
rather controversial, certain groups such as essential
personnel (e.g., health care workers, police, fire fighters,
and other individuals integral in responding to a public
health disaster) should receive priority. Essential personnel
are needed to prevent more casualties and fatalities and
could spread contagious diseases to many other people;
4. treat mental health consequences. Public health disasters
can result in significantly increased mental health prob-
lems including anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic
stress disorders.
25–28 Evidence suggests that even people
who witness, hear, or read about a disaster can be
affected.
29,30 Shortages of mental health professionals in
a disaster often require Internists to handle patients’
mental health issues.
31–35
5. treat comorbidity exacerbations. Evidence suggests that
undue environmental stresses can exacerbate comorbid-
ities such as heart disease and respiratory disease.
36–43 In
addition, during public health disasters, patients with
certain chronic diseases (e.g., diabetes and chronic ob-
structive pulmonary diseases) may not have adequate
access to maintenance treatments.
44
PROPER REPORTING AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CHAIN OF COMMAND
Figure 1 illustrates the public health chain of command.
Internists suspecting an attack or epidemic should immedi-
ately inform the local or state health department and contain
any possible threat in their clinics, especially if the agent is
contagious. Providing information to wrong people (especially
news media) may cause mass terror and delay the public
health system’s response. Therefore, Internists must remain
calm, understand how their words can be misunderstood and
misconstrued, follow instructions from appropriate health,
military and law enforcement officials, and allow properly
trained public health officials to deal with the media.
Local authorities are responsible for the initial response to
any public health emergency with appropriate state agencies
providing additional support when necessary. Depending on the
nature and magnitude of the problem, local or state authorities
may choose to involve federal agencies. Unlike naturally
occurring disease outbreaks, bioterrorist attacks are criminal
acts and require intervention of law enforcement agencies.
45
When there is a risk of contagious disease transmission
across state lines or state efforts are deemed inadequate, the
federal government assumes authority. The President makes
executive decisions. The CDC administers federal quarantine
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of Defense or the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). For travelers seeking to enter the United States, the
CDC has the authority to enact quarantine. In areas where the
CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine personnel
are not stationed, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and the United States Customs Service personnel are trained
to identify travelers with potential epidemic.
PRECAUTIONS AND LOCAL CONTAINMENT
It is essential that health care professionals adequately protect
themselves. They are needed to care for both victims of an
outbreak/attack and “regular” patients and can inadvertently
spread communicable agents rather quickly, especially to
vulnerable members of the population.
46,47 One study exam-
ined clinicians’ knowledge regarding proper infection control
practices during a bioterrorist event and found numerous
deficiencies.
48
Standard precautions should be exercised for all situations.
Internists should wash their hands frequently and be careful
when handling body tissues and fluids. Certain diseases
require additional precautions (Table 1). Contaminated cloth-
ing should be removed promptly and placed in sealed plastic
bags. Soap and warm water can wash off most noncontagious
agents.
49,50 Bleach is needed for chemical decontamination.
Any health care worker who receives a needle stick from a
potentially bacteremic anthrax-infected patient should receive
prophylactic antibiotics.
Although the words quarantine and isolation have been
erroneously used interchangeably, quarantine means the
separation and confinement of currently healthy people who
may have been exposed to a contagious disease, while isolation
refers to the separation and confinement of people known or
suspected to be infected with the contagious disease. When an
infectious disease is confined to a specific locale, the authority
to order quarantines usually rests with local or state public
health officials. When the event spreads across jurisdictional
boundaries within the state, such authority usually is relin-
Figure 1. Chain of command and departments, agencies, and offices that may be involved in a bioterrorist attack or epidemic. Source:
United States General Accounting Office (GAO). Adapted from GAO-03-373 State and Local Bioterrorism Preparedness.
62
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regulations from state to state.
51
CLINIC OPERATIONS
Clinic patient volume can increase significantly from ill patients
and concerned healthy patients (the “worried well”). This
“worried well” phenomenon was seen after the 2001 Anthrax
attacks.
52,53 Internists will have to offer reassurance to the
“worried well,” relay appropriate disease information, and direct
them to the right public health agencies and relevant websites
(e.g., Fig. 1 and websites listed in “Treatment and Prophylaxis”)
for information and mass prophylaxis (if needed).
54 Clinics
should minimize potentially contagious patients’ contact with
health care workers and other patients by either temporal
segregation (clustering potentially contagious patients later in
the day) or spatial segregation (shunting potentially contagious
patients towards specific rooms). Therefore, clinic schedulers
and telephone operators should be aware of the signs and
symptoms that suggest a patient is contagious.
55
Proper triaging is necessary. Minor issues and complaints
may have to wait, but urgent problems must be addressed. The
clinic will not operate with normal efficiency. Health care
workers may become ill or be absent. Running additional
tests, notifying authorities, taking on and off personal protec-
tive equipment, rearranging the clinic, and decontaminating
rooms will cause operational delays.
Clinics that routinely run at peak capacity could become
overwhelmed, especially if the clinic staff themselves become
ill. Every clinic should have clearly established contingency
plans and build an extra capacity that can handle unexpected
surges in patients.
56 Specifically clinics will need:
1. additional rooms to place and examine patients. Clinics
should identify other patient areas (e.g., procedure, radi-
ology, and operating rooms) that can be converted into
examination rooms. Rooms not normally used for patients
(e.g., offices or conference rooms) may be utilized if they
meet basic requirements for patients who do not require
isolation. Mobile clinics and hospitals may be available
57;
2. additional health care professionals and staff. Clinics
should know where and how to reach additional personnel
who are cross-trained to handle a wide range of responsi-
bilities in an emergency;
3. diversion plans. When a clinic is overwhelmed, it must
know when to close to additional patients and where to
send them.








negative pressure room and N95





Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)*
Plague (Yersinia pestis)* *
Smallpox (variola major)* * *
Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)*
Viral hemorrhagic fevers [filoviruses
e.g., Ebola, Marburg) and arenaviruses
(e.g., Lassa, Machupo)]
* * If cough, vomiting,
diarrhea or
hemorrhage*
Surgical mask and eye
protection if within
3 feet of patient*
Category B agents
Brucellosis (Brucella species) * If draining lesions*
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens *
Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species,
Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella)
*
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) * If skin involvement*
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)*
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)*
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)*
RicintoxinfromRicinuscommunis(castorbeans) *
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B *
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii)*
Viral encephalitis [alphaviruses
(e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis,
eastern equine encephalitis, western
equine encephalitis)]
*
Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio
cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)




Emerging infectious diseases such
as Nipah virus and hantavirus
*
Sources: City of Philadelphia Department of Public Health, Division of Disease Control, Summary of Biological Warfare Agents, and Saint Louis University.
School of Public Health Center for the Study of Bioterrorism and Emerging Infections.
*Precaution is required.
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Anytime medical treatment is administered, legal concerns
come into play. Public health disasters are no exception. In a
mass casualty setting, the ability to mount an adequate
response may be hindered by the myriad of rules and
regulations that govern the everyday practice of medicine.
Laws vary from state to state, so Internists should be aware of
their state’s specific regulations. Unfortunately, many states
have not yet adequately addressed or clarified medico-legal
issues and regulations in public health disasters.
45 Some of
these include:
1. licensing and admitting privileges. Internists willing to
provide assistance may not be licensed in that state, have
appropriate admitting privileges, or have the time or means
to complete the necessary paperwork before administering
treatment. Some states (e.g., Colorado) have introduced
statutes that ease some regulatory barriers by providing
protection to health care workers during a public health
disaster, such as allowing physicians to administer care
even though they are not licensed in that state;
2. malpractice liability. While states do have “Good Samari-
tan” laws that offer some legal protection to physicians who
aid strangers in “good faith,” the extent of these laws varies
from state to state and currently do not cover all potential
eventualities. “Good Samaritan Laws” may not apply when
treatment is administered against a patient’s will.
58
3. maintaining patient confidentiality. Bioterrorist attacks
and epidemics require physicians to quickly transmit
patient and case information to other health care personnel
and appropriate authorities. While such communication is
paramount, efforts should be made to maintain patient
confidentiality and transmit only necessary information. At
present, it is unclear how Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations would affect the
public health and health care system response. In a public
health emergency, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does allow
disclosure of the following protected health information
(PHI): for treatment by health care providers; to avert a
serious threat to health or safety; to public health author-
ities for public health purposes; to protect national securi-
ty; to law enforcement under certain conditions; and for
judicial or administrative proceedings.
59,60 However, dur-
ing an emergency, misunderstandings of the Privacy Rule’s
requirements may hinder the flow of PHI.
61
SUMMARY
As Internists could play a vital role in epidemics, disease
outbreaks, or bioterrorist attacks, they must be knowledge-
able, equipped, and prepared. In an emergency, potential legal
and administrative barriers should be eased. Clinics should
have appropriate contingency plans. Although the risk of
large-scale attacks and epidemics seems low, the risk of
smaller epidemics and local public health emergencies is
much higher. Preparing for large events will help prepare for
such smaller events.
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